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This issue of the Case Western Reserve Law Review focuses on the 
work of Fred Gray, one of the nation’s preeminent civil rights lawyers 
and a 1954 graduate of our law school. Mr. Gray’s many accolades 
include the American Bar Association’s Thurgood Marshall Award, the 
Federal Bar Association’s Sarah T. Hughes Award, Harvard Law 
School’s Charles Hamilton Houston Medallion of Freedom, and numer-
ous honorary degrees. He has served as president of the National Bar 
Association and was the first African-American president of the Ala-
bama State Bar Association. In addition, he was one of the first two 
African Americans elected to the Alabama legislature since Reconstruc-
tion. This issue contains Articles that were presented at a symposium 
that took place in October 2016. 
 
†  David L. Brennan Professor Emeritus of Law and Political Science, Case 
Western Reserve University. 
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I. Background 
Growing up in Montgomery, Alabama, Fred Gray expected to enter 
the ministry. To that end, he left his hometown to enroll in a church-
related high school called the Nashville Christian Institute.1 There he 
became a “boy preacher” who traveled around the country with the 
Institute’s president on fund-raising and recruiting trips and served as 
a part-time minister for area congregations.2 He returned to Montgom-
ery and graduated in 1951 from what was then the Alabama State 
College for Negroes (now Alabama State University). While at Alabama 
State, Fred Gray decided to become a lawyer who would “use the law 
to ‘destroy everything segregated [he] could find.’”3 
Because Alabama was rigidly segregated at the time, Mr. Gray had 
to attend law school elsewhere. The state, although unwilling to give 
him a legal education within its borders, had a program that would 
cover some of his expenses at an institution outside the South. These 
arrangements almost certainly were unlawful even in 1951.4 More in-
terested in becoming a lawyer than in being a litigant and convinced 
that the white power structure would prevent him from becoming a 
lawyer if he challenged the admissions rules, he enrolled at what then 
was called Western Reserve University in the fall of 1951.5 After gradu-
ating in 1954, he returned home and was admitted to the Alabama bar.6 
Perhaps providentially for his goal of destroying everything segregated 
he could find, less than a month before he graduated the Supreme Court 
 
1. Fred D. Gray, Bus Ride to Justice 7–8, 269 (rev. ed. 2013). 
2. Id. at 9, 270. 
3. Id. at 13. He did not abandon his interest in religion. During his college years, 
he was a part-time minister at several churches in the Montgomery area; 
while in law school he was assistant minister at a Cleveland church. Id. at 
270–71. And after becoming a lawyer, he served as minister of churches in 
Montgomery and Tuskegee for many years. Id. at 272–74. 
4. The separate-but-equal doctrine, see Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), 
was still in effect at the time. But under that rule, the Supreme Court had 
held that states with whites-only law schools had to provide substantially 
equal opportunities for legal education to persons of all races, see Sipuel v. 
Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (per curiam), and had applied a rigorous 
standard of substantial equality. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
And more than a dozen years before Mr. Gray entered law school, the Court 
had rejected the kind of out-of-state subsidy that Alabama offered him. See 
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938). 
5. Gray, supra note 1, at 13–15. 
6. Id. at 27. Before sitting for the Alabama bar examination in July 1954, he 
prudently sat for the Ohio bar in June just in case anything went wrong at 
home. Id. at 22. He passed both tests. Id. at 27. 
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issued its ruling against school segregation in Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation.7 
II. Supreme Court Cases 
In his first ten years as a lawyer, Fred Gray played a significant 
role in four landmark Supreme Court cases. He also has handled numer-
ous other civil rights cases for more than six decades.8 Let us begin with 
the Supreme Court cases before turning to other civil rights issues. 
A. The Montgomery Bus Boycott: Gayle v. Browder9 
Fred Gray’s remarkable legal career effectively began with the Dec-
ember 1, 1955, arrest of Rosa Parks for refusing to surrender her seat 
on a Montgomery bus to a white passenger. Mr. Gray, who had not yet 
reached his twenty-fifth birthday, represented her.10 The arrest of Mrs. 
Parks led to a 382-day boycott of the buses.11 That protest movement 
was coordinated by the newly created Montgomery Improvement Asso-
ciation. Mr. Gray was the lawyer for the MIA.12 And the most visible 
leader of that organization was a previously unknown young minister 
named Martin Luther King, Jr. Mr. Gray was Dr. King’s lawyer for 
several years until King moved to Atlanta.13 
While the Rosa Parks case wended its way through the Alabama 
court system, Fred Gray filed a separate lawsuit in federal court that 
directly challenged the constitutionality of the Montgomery ordinance 
and the Alabama statute that required segregation on the buses.14 The 
 
7. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see Gray, supra note 1, at 186. 
8. One of Mr. Gray’s law school professors encouraged him to consult with other 
lawyers and not to hesitate giving them credit for their help. Gray, supra 
note 1, at 17. He has followed that advice consistently. I generally do not 
indicate the other lawyers with whom he worked on the cases discussed here, 
but the references to his memoir do acknowledge those other lawyers by name. 
9. 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam). 
10. Gray, supra note 1, at 49–50, 55–57; see Parks v. City of Montgomery, 92 
So. 2d 683, 684 (Ala. Ct. App. 1957). 
11. Gray, supra note 1, at 37 & n.3. 
12. Id. at 52–53. 
13. Id. at 53–54. Mr. Gray declined Dr. King’s invitation to move with him to 
Atlanta, preferring to remain in Montgomery to continue his fight against 
segregation there. Id. at 145, 155. 
14. Because of the way the prosecutor structured the charges against Mrs. Parks, 
her case did not present a clear opportunity for a direct challenge to the 
constitutionality of the ordinance. Id. at 56. 
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named plaintiffs in Browder v. Gayle15 included Claudette Colvin, 
whose arrest earlier in 1955 for refusing to relinquish her seat nearly 
precipitated a mass protest.16 Rosa Parks deliberately was omitted from 
the case in order to preempt any claim that the federal case represented 
a collateral attack on her state-court proceedings.17 The Supreme Court, 
in November 1956, summarily affirmed a three-judge district court rul-
ing that the ordinance was unconstitutional, a decision that vindicated 
the Montgomery bus boycott and helped to lead to the desegregation 
of the buses.18 
B. Freedom of Association: NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson19 
Meanwhile, many segregationists thought that the Montgomery bus 
boycott must have been fomented by outside agitators and subversives. 
Alabama Attorney General John Patterson, claiming that the NAACP 
was a foreign corporation that had not qualified to do business in the 
state, demanded that the organization produce the names, addresses, 
and telephone numbers of all its Alabama members.20 His theory was 
transparent if only implicit: the NAACP was behind the civil rights 
movement, helping African Americans gain admission to whites-only 
public universities such as the University of Alabama21 and supporting 
the bus boycott as well as other efforts to undermine segregation. If 
only the NAACP could be shut down, Alabama’s otherwise contented 
Negroes would return to life as usual. 
Fred Gray was local counsel to the NAACP throughout the litiga-
tion over the state’s effort to prevent it from operating in Alabama. 
When the organization refused to surrender its membership records, a 
state judge issued a contempt order and imposed a fine of $100,000. 
The dispute ultimately went to the Supreme Court, which ruled in 
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson that the order to disclose the 
membership records violated the First Amendment. The Court reason-
ed that mandatory disclosure of membership information might deter 
individuals from joining or remaining in the organization for fear of 
physical or economic reprisal, particularly when the identity of the 
group’s members had nothing to do with Alabama’s purported interest 
 
15. 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala.) (three-judge court), aff’d mem., 352 U.S. 903 
(1956). 
16. Gray, supra note 1, at 43–45, 72. 
17. Id. at 72. 
18. Id. at 92–95. 
19. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
20. Gray, supra note 1, at 105–06. 
21. An African-American woman, Autherine Lucy, briefly attended the Univer-
sity of Alabama in 1956. See infra text accompanying notes 84–85. 
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in determining whether the NAACP was required to register to do busi-
ness in the state.22 This foundational case established important princi-
ples about freedom of association and laid the foundation for a series of 
later decisions that struck down other efforts to harass or outlaw the 
NAACP and other controversial groups.23 
C. Racial Gerrymandering: Gomillion v. Lightfoot24 
Even before the NAACP case reached the Supreme Court, segrega-
tionist politicians launched another attack on civil rights by redrawing 
the boundaries of Tuskegee, a city with an unusually large proportion 
of African-American professionals who worked at Tuskegee Institute 
(now Tuskegee University) and a large Veterans Administration hos-
pital that served only black patients during the segregation era.25 The 
gerrymandering law26 transformed the shape of Tuskegee from a square 
to what Mr. Gray described as a “25-sided sea dragon”27 and what the 
Supreme Court in Gomillion v. Lightfoot28 described as “an uncouth 
twenty-eight-sided figure.”29 This cartographic sleight of hand removed 
all but four or five of the approximately 400 African-American voters 
 
22. Id. at 462–66; Gray, supra note 1, at 107. This ruling did not discourage 
Patterson, who was elected governor in November 1958 after a bruising pri-
mary against George Wallace, or other state officials. They litigated for six 
more years, including three more trips to the Supreme Court, before the 
NAACP was allowed to operate there. See NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Flowers, 
377 U.S. 288, 290–93 (1964) (summarizing subsequent developments); Gray, 
supra note 1, at 106. 
23. See, e.g., Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); 
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. 
NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Bates 
v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); see generally Numan V. Bartley, 
The Rise of Massive Resistance: Race and Politics in the South 
During the 1950s, 212–24 (1969); Mark V. Tushnet, Making Civil 
Rights Law: Thurgood Marshall and the Supreme Court, 1936–
1961, 283–300 (1994); Walter F. Murphy, The South Counterattacks: The 
Anti-NAACP Laws, 12 W. Pol. Q. 371, 374–80, 386–88 (1959). 
24. 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
25. See Gray, supra note 1, at 109. 
26. Act of July 15, 1957, No. 140, 1957 Ala. Acts 185. 
27. Gray, supra note 1, at 113. 
28. 364 U.S. 339 (1960). I have discussed this case in considerably more detail 
in an article that appeared in another civil rights symposium. See Jonathan 
L. Entin, Of Squares and Uncouth Twenty-Eight-Sided Figures: Reflections on 
Gomillion v. Lightfoot After Half a Century, 50 Washburn L.J. 133 (2010). 
29. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 340. 
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from Tuskegee while leaving every single white voter within the city 
limits.30 
Mr. Gray filed Gomillion v. Lightfoot on behalf of many of the ex-
cluded voters, but the lawsuit faced a seemingly insurmountable ob-
stacle in the form of the Supreme Court’s 1946 decision in Colegrove v. 
Green,31 which had rejected a challenge to the way a state had drawn 
its congressional districts as a nonjusticiable political question. So daun-
ting was this obstacle that national NAACP general counsel Robert 
Carter, who worked with Gray on both Browder v. Gayle and NAACP 
v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, initially discouraged him from pursuing 
the Tuskegee case.32 Gray eventually persuaded Carter that the lawsuit 
could succeed, and the two divided the oral argument in the Supreme 
Court.33 
At the very beginning of the Gomillion litigation, Mr. Gray obtain-
ed a map showing the Tuskegee city limits before and after passage of 
the gerrymandering law. He never got to use the map in the district 
court, which dismissed the case on the basis of Colegrove v. Green.34 
But he had the map mounted on an easel when he appeared in the 
Supreme Court.35 Scarcely a minute into his argument, he was inter-
rupted by Justice Frankfurter, a stickler for procedure and the author 
of the Colegrove opinion. Instead of a professorial scolding about juris-
dictional technicalities, Frankfurter asked the twenty-nine-year-old 
lawyer to show him the location of Tuskegee Institute. When Gray 
pointed to the map showing that the Institute no longer was within the 
city limits, the justice was incredulous.36 Indeed, Frankfurter wrote the 
opinion for a unanimous Court striking down the Tuskegee gerryman-
dering law. Unlike Colegrove, the Tuskegee case involved a complete 
denial of the right to vote and therefore did not involve a nonjusticiable 
political question.37 As if to underscore the point, the Court reproduced 
Mr. Gray’s map as an appendix to its opinion.38 
 
30. Id. at 341; Gray, supra note 1, at 3, 113–14. 
31. 328 U.S. 549 (1946). 
32. Gray, supra note 1, at 114–15. Carter’s skepticism seemed well founded 
when the case failed in the lower courts. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 167 F. Supp. 
405 (M.D. Ala. 1958), aff’d, 270 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1959). 
33. Gray, supra note 1, at 115, 117. 
34. Id. at 116. 
35. Id. at 3, 117–18. 
36. Id. at 4, 118. 
37. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 346–47. 
38. Id. at 348. Mr. Gray also has reproduced the map. See Gray, supra note 1, 
at 228. 
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Mr. Gray believes that Gomillion v. Lightfoot was his “most impor-
tant” case.39 It was the Supreme Court’s first racial gerrymandering 
decision, and it has become a leading precedent in the law of voting 
rights. It also has figured prominently in equal protection doctrine more 
generally, as Alabama’s unsubtle effort to exclude African Americans 
from Tuskegee has become a leading example of how to infer discrimina-
tory intent in constitutional cases.40 Moreover, Gomillion v. Lightfoot 
laid a key part of the foundation for Baker v. Carr41 and the long line 
of reapportionment decisions that followed from that ruling. 
D. Constitutionalizing the Law of Defamation:  
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan42 
Even before Gomillion was argued in the Supreme Court, yet 
another of Mr. Gray’s landmark cases was getting started. On March 
29, 1960, less than two months after the first sit-in demonstration in 
Greensboro, North Carolina, and not long after Alabama authorities 
had indicted Martin Luther King and had him arrested for perjury in 
connection with his state income taxes,43 the New York Times published 
a full-page advertisement condemning segregation and seeking political, 
moral, and financial support for the civil rights movement.44 The pub-
lication of this advertisement set in motion the events that culminated 
in the Supreme Court’s decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.45 
Claiming that several statements in the ad defamed him, Montgomery 
Police Commissioner L.B. Sullivan filed a libel suit seeking $500,000 in 
damages. Sullivan named as defendants the newspaper and four 
Alabama ministers whose names appeared in the ad. The inclusion of 
Ralph Abernathy, Joseph Lowery, S.S. Seay, Sr., and Fred 
Shuttlesworth as parties meant that the case, which arose under Ala-
bama law, would have to proceed in the state courts because the case 
 
39. Gray, supra note 1, at 119. 
40. See also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
41. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). See generally Law Review Symposium 2011: Baker v. 
Carr After 50 Years: Appraising the Reapportionment Revolution: Introduc-
tion, 62 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 941 (2012). 
42. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
43. Gray, supra note 1, at 146; see infra Part III.B. 
44. Comm. to Defend Martin Luther King and the Struggle for Freedom in the 
South, Heed Their Rising Voices, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1960, at 25, re-
printed in N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 App. (1964). 
45. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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would not fall under the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts.46 
Fred Gray represented the four ministers.47 
At trial he presented evidence that the names of the ministers had 
been included without their knowledge or consent and argued that Sulli-
van had offered only one slender piece of testimony about their involve-
ment: they had not responded to his letter demanding that they retract 
the allegedly defamatory statements in the ad.48 To that contention 
Gray noted that the ministers had nothing to do with the ad and there-
fore could not “retract that which they had not tracted.”49 Nevertheless, 
the jury quickly returned a verdict for the full $500,000 that Sullivan 
had sought.50 
All of the defendants filed timely appeals. Unfortunately, the mini-
sters could not afford to post a supersedeas bond and, for strategic 
reasons, the Times would not agree to let them subscribe to its bond.51 
This meant that Sullivan could sell their assets to satisfy the judgment 
even during the pendency of the appeal. Although successful plaintiffs 
customarily did not levy against the property of a defendant before the 
conclusion of the appellate process, Sullivan did in fact levy against 
property belonging to all of the ministers.52 Of course, this was no ordi-
nary case: the whole point of the litigation was to punish civil rights 
activists53 and to make it difficult, if not impossible, for the national 
press to report on the movement.54 The Supreme Court recognized the 
significance of the case and overturned the judgment, establishing 
strong First Amendment protection for critics of public officials. This 
ruling provided much of the grounding for modern defamation law. In 
order for public officials and public figures to recover, they must prove, 
by clear and convincing evidence, that a defamatory statement was 
 
46. Mr. Gray had opened his first law office in space he sublet from Dr. Seay. 
Gray, supra note 1, at 28. 
47. Id. at 156. Two other Alabama lawyers, including Solomon S. Seay, Jr., were 
part of the ministers’ defense team that Mr. Gray coordinated. Id. at 157. 
48. Id. at 160. 
49. Id. at 160–61. 
50. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256; Gray, supra note 1, at 161. 
51. Gray, supra note 1, at 161–62. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 162. 
54. Several other Alabama officials also had sued the Times. See Sullivan, 376 
U.S. at 278 n.18. The newspaper faced potential liability of $5.6 million in 
eleven libel suits, and CBS faced another potential liability of $1.7 million in 
five others. Id. at 295 (Black, J., concurring). 
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published with actual malice—in other words, with knowledge that the 
statement was false or with reckless disregard for its truth.55 
Of particular significance, the Court accepted the argument that 
Mr. Gray had made at trial: that “there was no evidence whatever” 
that the ministers were responsible for any “erroneous statements” in 
the ad.56 On a practical level, this ruling also meant that Sullivan could 
not keep the ministers’ property against which he had levied. They 
never got back the actual property at issue, but Sullivan did have to 
remit the proceeds of the sale of those assets.57 
III. Other Cases 
A. The Tuskegee Syphilis Litigation 
Mr. Gray’s best-known case that did not reach the Supreme Court 
dealt with the infamous Tuskegee syphilis study.58 This forty-year pro-
ject was designed to examine the effects of untreated syphilis, but 
participants were never told the purpose of the study, never received 
accurate information about their health, and never got treatment even 
when such treatment was readily available. The lawsuit resulted in a 
settlement that provided financial compensation to the living partici-
pants and to the heirs of those who had died.59 And in 1997, President 
Bill Clinton formally apologized on behalf of the United States gover-
nment for what it had done.60 
Beyond this case and the high-profile Supreme Court cases dis-
cussed earlier, Fred Gray played an important role in numerous others 
that dramatically reshaped Alabama. Some of them had significant im-
plications for more general legal developments, paving the way for later 
Supreme Court decisions and for cases elsewhere in the nation. They 
 
55. Id. at 279–80, 285–86. The Sullivan case dealt only with public officials, 
but the actual-malice rule soon was extended to public figures. See Curtis 
Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
56. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 286. 
57. Gray, supra note 1, at 163. 
58. See Pollard v. United States, 384 F. Supp. 304 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (denying 
defendants’ motions for summary judgment on most federal claims); Pollard 
v. United States, 69 F.R.D. 646 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (awarding attorneys’ fees 
following settlement). Mr. Gray has written his own account of that case. 
Fred D. Gray, The Tuskegee Syphilis Study (2013). For other accounts, 
see James H. Jones, Bad Blood: The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment 
(new and expanded ed. 1993); Susan M. Reverby, Examining Tuskegee: 
The Infamous Syphilis Study and Its Legacy (2009). 
59. Gray, supra note 1, at 300. 
60. Id. at 367. 
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involved sit-in demonstrators, Freedom Riders, the desegregation of 
public schools and universities, and voting rights. 
B. The Perjury Trial of Martin Luther King 
Martin Luther King moved to Atlanta in late 1959, but the Ala-
bama authorities continued their effort to discredit him. Acting at the 
behest of John Patterson, who by then had become governor,61 the pro-
secutor in Montgomery indicted Dr. King for perjury in connection with 
his 1956 and 1958 state income tax returns.62 This apparently was the 
first time that anyone in Alabama ever had been charged with a felony 
in connection with alleged tax evasion.63 Moreover, state authorities 
took the public step of having him arrested in Atlanta instead of quietly 
notifying him of charge so that he could arrange to return discreetly to 
post bond as was customary in many criminal cases.64 
The perjury charge threatened to destroy Dr. King’s credibility as 
the moral leader of the civil rights movement by portraying him as a 
selfish, dishonest con man who was enriching himself at the expense of 
gullible supporters.65 As noted earlier, the advertisement that gave rise 
to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan sought to raise funds at least in 
part to support his legal defense in the perjury case.66 Fred Gray coor-
dinated the legal team that represented Dr. King in the perjury case.67 
The lawyers meticulously presented their defense, but mindful of the 
verdict against the ministers at Commissioner Sullivan’s trial they were 
not entirely confident that the jurors would decide the case on the evi-
dence.68 Much to their surprise and relief, the all-white jury returned a 
verdict of not guilty.69 That verdict enabled Dr. King to retain his 
credibility. It also might account for why this potentially devastating 
trial has fallen into relative obscurity despite its danger to Dr. King 
and the civil rights movement.70 
 
61. See supra note 22. 
62. Gray, supra note 1, at 146. 
63. Id. at 147. 
64. Id. at 146. 
65. Id. at 147–48. 
66. See supra text accompanying notes 43–44. 
67. Gray, supra note 1, at 149. 
68. See id. at 152–54.  
69. Id. at 154. 
70. Id. Perhaps that helps to explain why this episode has received such limited 
scholarly attention. For more detailed discussion, see Edgar Dyer, A 
“Triumph of Justice” in Alabama: The 1960 Perjury Trial of Martin Luther 
King, Jr., 88 J. Afr.-Am. Hist. 245 (2003); Leonard S. Rubinowitz, Martin 
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C. Sit-In Demonstrators 
The King perjury trial was not the only case that grew out of events 
discussed in the advertisement that gave rise to New York Times Co. 
v. Sullivan. One of the statements at issue in the ad related to the 
expulsion of several Alabama State students in connection with a civil 
rights demonstration. The ad mistakenly said that the demonstration 
had taken place on the steps of the state capitol when in fact the stu-
dents had held a sit-in at a lunch counter in the county courthouse.71 
This demonstration took place in late February 1960, one of the hun-
dreds of similar protests that were inspired by the Greensboro sit-in at 
the beginning of the month.72 Although the students were not arrested, 
the college president yielded to pressure from Governor Patterson and 
expelled the students.73 
Mr. Gray filed suit in federal court, claiming that the expulsions 
without notice or hearing deprived the students of due process of law. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Dixon v. 
Alabama State Board of Education,74 ruled that the vital importance of 
education meant that the state could not arbitrarily dismiss, for disci-
plinary reasons, a student who otherwise was in good standing. Care-
fully limiting its ruling to cases involving misbehavior as opposed to 
unsatisfactory academic performance, the court explained that the insti-
tution had to provide the students with specific notice of the charges 
against them and an opportunity for at least a rudimentary adversarial 
proceeding before expelling them.75 
This decision had profound implications.76 It marked the first time 
that a court had held that students at public colleges and universities 
had a sufficiently strong interest in obtaining an education that proce-
dural due process required a hearing before they could be dismissed for 
misbehavior. The Supreme Court later described Dixon as a “landmark 
decision” when it found that public school students also enjoyed due 
process protection that entitled them to some kind of hearing before 
being suspended or expelled.77 
 
Luther King’s Perjury Trial: A Potential Turning Point and a Footnote to 
History, 5 Ind. J.L. & Soc. Equality 237 (2017). 
71. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 259 (1964). 
72. See Gray, supra note 1, at 165–66.  
73. Id. at 166–67. 
74. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961). 
75. Id. at 158–59. 
76. See Gray, supra note 1, at 168–69.  
77. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 n.8 (1975). 
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But Dixon had even broader significance. Existing doctrine reflected 
the right-privilege distinction: due process required a pre-deprivation 
hearing only when a constitutional right was at stake, and courts had 
defined rights narrowly; interests that did not rise to the level of consti-
tutional rights were treated as privileges that were not subject to due 
process protections.78 Although the Supreme Court had expressed ambi-
valence about the rigidity of the right-privilege distinction when Dixon 
arose, it would be another decade before the Court formally abandoned 
that approach. And the justices invoked Dixon when they finally did 
so.79 
D. Freedom Riders 
When the Freedom Riders reached Montgomery in May 1961, Fred 
Gray helped to represent them. A mob of white rioters attacked the 
riders when they arrived at the local Greyhound bus station.80 After 
this group continued on their trip several days later, another group, 
including Ralph Abernathy and Yale University chaplain William Sloan 
Coffin, was arrested at the Trailways terminal while seeking service at 
the whites-only lunch counter. Mr. Gray took a leading role in the liti-
gation arising from these events.81 First, he handled the criminal cases 
in the Alabama courts. Although the defendants were found guilty at 
trial, the Supreme Court eventually overturned the convictions.82 Mean-
while, he also obtained an injunction directing Greyhound, Trailways, 
and their affiliates to operate their buses and terminals on a desegre-
gated basis.83 
E. Desegregation of Public Education 
Alabama implacably resisted desegregation of public education at 
any level. An African-American student attended the University of Ala-
bama for a few days in February 1956. Autherine Lucy applied while 
Fred Gray was still in law school and was admitted in February 1956 
pursuant to a court order that the state litigated all the way to the 
 
78. As Justice Holmes famously put it in a case involving a police officer who 
was fired for engaging in political activity: “The petitioner may have a consti-
tutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a police-
man.” McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892). 
79. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 n.9 (1970); see also Tinker v. Des 
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 n.2 (1969) (citing Dixon 
in establishing that public school students enjoy free speech rights). 
80. Gray, supra note 1, at 173–75. 
81. Id. at 175–78. 
82. Abernathy v. State, 155 So. 2d 586 (Ala. Ct. App. 1962), rev’d mem., 380 
U.S. 447 (1965). 
83. Lewis v. Greyhound Corp., 199 F. Supp. 210 (M.D. Ala. 1961). 
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Supreme Court.84 Segregationists rioted against her presence on cam-
pus, and she was first suspended (supposedly for her own safety) and 
then expelled (supposedly for criticism that she and her lawyers made 
of the university’s handling of the situation).85 Otherwise, as late as 
1963 not a single public school or university in the state had begun to 
desegregate. Mr. Gray played a major role in ending segregation in 
those institutions. 
His efforts began with his work on behalf of Vivian Malone and 
James Hood; she would become the University of Alabama’s first 
African-American graduate. They were admitted to the university in 
June 1963 pursuant to another federal court order, but not before Gov-
ernor George Wallace’s notorious “stand in the schoolhouse door” as an 
act of symbolic defiance.86 A few months later, Mr. Gray helped to 
obtain an injunction that led to the admission of Harold Franklin as 
the first African-American student at Auburn University.87 
Mr. Gray also played a significant part in a series of cases that 
sought to desegregate public elementary and secondary schools around 
the state.88 The most important of these lawsuits involved Macon Coun-
ty, where Governor Wallace intervened to prevent local authorities 
from complying with a federal court order to desegregate the Tuskegee 
schools.89 Wallace’s intervention proved to be a colossal legal blunder, 
because it afforded Mr. Gray the opportunity to add the governor as a 
defendant and led ultimately to an injunction requiring the desegrega-
tion of all public schools throughout Alabama.90 
 
84. Lucy v. Adams, 134 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. Ala.), aff’d per curiam, 228 F.2d 
619 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 931 (1956). The lawsuit seeking 
Ms. Lucy’s admission to the university was filed in 1953; the legal process 
leading to her matriculation consumed the better part of three years. See E. 
Culpepper Clark, The Schoolhouse Door 39 (1993); Jack Green-
berg, Crusaders in the Courts 225 (1994); Gray, supra note 1, at 186. 
85. See United States v. Alabama, 628 F. Supp. 1137, 1141–42 (N.D. Ala. 1985), 
rev’d on other grounds, 828 F.2d 1532 (11th Cir. 1987). See generally Clark, 
supra note 84, at 53–104. 
86. Lucy v. Adams, 224 F. Supp. 79 (N.D. Ala. 1963), aff’d per curiam sub nom. 
McCorvey v. Lucy, 328 F.2d 892 (5th Cir. 1964); Gray, supra note 1, at 
187–88. See generally Clark, supra note 84, at 145–237. 
87. Franklin v. Parker, 223 F. Supp. 724 (M.D. Ala. 1963), aff’d per curiam as 
modified, 331 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1964); Gray, supra note 1, at 191–92. 
88. See Gray, supra note 1, at 198–203. 
89. Id. at 203–12; see Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ., 231 F. Supp. 743 (M.D. 
Ala. 1964) (three-judge court). 
90. Gray, supra note 1, at 209–10; see Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ., 267 F. 
Supp. 458, 480 (M.D. Ala. 1967) (three-judge court), aff’d mem. sub nom. 
Wallace v. United States, 389 U.S. 215 (1967). 
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He also took a leading role in a desegregation case involving public 
schools in Montgomery that led to another major decision. Mr. Gray 
obtained an order requiring that the public schools begin desegregation 
in the fall of 1964.91 But desegregation of faculty lagged far behind. 
Accordingly, he returned to court in Carr v. Montgomery County Board 
of Education.92 The district court imposed specific numerical hiring 
goals and timetables for each school in the district.93 Although the court 
of appeals thought that this approach was overly rigid,94 the Supreme 
Court unanimously upheld the district court’s remedial order.95 This 
landmark ruling authorized courts to use goals and timetables as a rem-
edy for racial discrimination, a principle that the high court itself has 
endorsed in several subsequent cases that relied on the Montgomery 
County ruling.96 
F. Voting Rights 
The Tuskegee gerrymandering case, Gomillion v. Lightfoot,97 pro-
tected the right of African Americans to vote. But that case was only 
one of Fred Gray’s contributions to voting rights law. He played a cen-
tral role in the litigation surrounding the Selma-Montgomery march 
that helped to pave the way for passage of the Voting Rights Act of 
1965,98 and he filed two of the earliest and most consequential lawsuits 
under that new law. 
 
91. Carr v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Educ., 232 F. Supp. 705 (M.D. Ala. 1964). 
That ruling required the desegregation of the first, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth 
grades in 1964. Id. at 709. The court subsequently ordered the desegregation 
of all grades by the fall of 1967. Carr v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Educ., 253 
F. Supp. 306, 307 (M.D. Ala. 1966). The subsequent order also directed that 
the board of education take steps to desegregate the faculty in all schools. 
See id. at 310. 
92. 289 F. Supp. 647 (M.D. Ala. 1968), aff’d as modified, 400 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 
1968), rev’d sub nom. United States v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Educ., 395 
U.S. 225 (1969). 
93. Id. at 654. See Gray, supra note 1, at 202. 
94. Carr, 400 F.2d at 7–8. 
95. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. at 235. 
96. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 180 n.30 (1987) (desegrega-
tion of state police department); Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l 
Ass’n v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 478 U.S. 421, 450 n.27 (1986) 
(alleviation of discriminatory labor union membership policies); Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1971) (desegregation 
of public schools). 
97. See supra Part II.C. 
98. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 10301–
10702 (2012)). 
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Following the events of Bloody Sunday at the Edmund Pettus 
Bridge in Selma, civil rights advocates promised that they would com-
plete the march to Montgomery that state and local law enforcement 
officers had so brutally suppressed. On March 8, 1965, the day after 
Bloody Sunday, Fred Gray filed suit in federal district court seeking an 
order requiring Governor Wallace and other officials to permit the 
march to proceed.99 In Williams v. Wallace,100 the United States District 
Court for the Middle District of Alabama issued a preliminary injunc-
tion directing state and local authorities not only to allow the march 
but also to protect the marchers, and it also approved the detailed plans 
for the route of the demonstration.101 
After the Voting Rights Act was adopted, due in no small measure 
to the Selma-Montgomery march, Fred Gray filed two of the earliest 
lawsuits under the new law. The first of these cases, Sellers v. 
Trussell,102 helped to establish the principle that proof of a disparate 
impact on a protected class could establish a statutory violation.103 The 
dispute arose when the Alabama legislature extended the four-year 
terms of some incumbent county commissioners to six years. That move 
prevented African Americans in that county from voting for those posi-
tions for two more years and kept in place commissioners who had been 
elected when blacks were not allowed to cast ballots, so the extension 
of the incumbents’ terms had a discriminatory effect.104 
Mr. Gray’s other case was the first vote-dilution suit brought under 
the Voting Rights Act and paved the way for numerous others.105 Smith 
 
99. Gray, supra note 1, at 216. 
100. 240 F. Supp. 100 (M.D. Ala. 1965). For a discussion of the broader First 
Amendment implications of this decision, see Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., 
Celebrating Selma: The Importance of Context in Public Forum Analysis, 
104 Yale L.J. 1411 (1995). 
101. Williams, 240 F. Supp. at 108, 110; id. at 120–21; see Gray, supra note 1, 
at 216–17. The court of appeals denied the state’s emergency motion for a 
stay of the district court’s order. Williams v. Wallace, 10 Race Rel. L. Rep. 
230 (5th Cir. Mar. 19, 1965); see Gray, supra note 1, at 217 (detailing the 
hectic trip to New Orleans for an expedited hearing on the state’s request of 
a stay). Mr. Gray and his wife also hosted most of the march leaders in their 
home for a meeting to draw up the plans for the fifth and final day of the 
march, and he was among the delegates who met with Governor Wallace in 
the state capitol in a fruitless effort to persuade him to support voting rights 
for African Americans. Id. at 218–19. 
102. 253 F. Supp. 915 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (three-judge court). 
103. See Gray, supra note 1, at 246–47. The Supreme Court endorsed this 
principle under Title VII five years later. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 
U.S. 424 (1971). 
104. Sellers, 253 F. Supp. at 917. 
105. Gray, supra note 1, at 249–50. 
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v. Paris106 challenged a change to the system for electing members of 
the Democratic Party executive committee in George Wallace’s home 
county.107 For many years, the overwhelming majority of committee 
members were elected from districts, which were referred to as beats. 
Many African Americans registered to vote for the first time after the 
passage of the Voting Rights Act. Several African-Americans who lived 
in majority-black beats ran for seats on the executive committee. The 
party thereupon adopted a system of at-large election for all executive 
committee members. Although the African-American candidates won 
in their beats, they lost the at-large contest to white candidates in a 
county with a large majority of white voters who refused to vote for 
black candidates.108 This sequence of events, the United States District 
Court for the Middle District of Alabama concluded, provided compell-
ing evidence of a discriminatory purpose to dilute the votes of African 
Americans.109 This scheme of vote dilution therefore was unlawful.110 
IV. The Symposium 
Fred Gray has spoken many times at our law school and at the 
university. He has been a member of the board of trustees and has 
received numerous tributes, including an honorary degree from the uni-
versity in 1992 and the Centennial Medal, the law school’s highest 
award, in 1993.111 He also is no stranger to the pages of this journal.112 
But the editors of the Case Western Reserve Law Review decided to 
conduct a daylong symposium focusing on Fred Gray’s extraordinary 
legal career. That symposium took place on October 14, 2016. This issue 
contains articles that were presented on that occasion.113 
 
106. 257 F. Supp. 901 (M.D. Ala. 1966), modified and aff’d per curiam, 386 F.2d 
979 (5th Cir. 1967). 
107. Gray, supra note 1, at 249–50. 
108. Smith, 257 F. Supp. at 903. 
109. Id. at 904. 
110. Id. at 905. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit fully 
endorsed the district court’s reasoning, but modified the remedy to take 
effect sooner than the lower court had ordered. Id. at 980. 
111. See Gray, supra note 1, at 400. Indeed, on the day of this symposium the 
university conferred its Distinguished Alumnus Award on Mr. Gray. 
112. See Fred D. Gray, The Sullivan Case: A Direct Product of the Civil Rights 
Movement, 42 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1223 (1992); Fred D. Gray, Bus Ride 
to Justice: A Conversation with Fred Gray (Introduction by Jonathan L. 
Entin), 64 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 733 (2014). 
113. A video recording of the entire symposium is available online. Case Western 
Reserve University School of Law, In Honor of Fred Gray: Making Civil 
Rights Law from Rosa Parks to the 21st Century, YouTube (Oct. 14, 2016), 
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David Garrow, eminent historian of the civil rights movement,114 
begins the symposium by placing Mr. Gray’s work on the Montgomery 
bus boycott into broader perspective.115 Professor Garrow explains the 
background to that famous protest, including the role of the Women’s 
Political Council and its leaders who helped to mobilize and implement 
the boycott. In the process, he shows how Mr. Gray went beyond liti-
gating on behalf of Rosa Parks and those who directly challenged the 
constitutionality of Montgomery’s segregation ordinance to providing 
vital behind-the-scenes leadership that helped to make the boycott 
effective. 
The next three articles address various aspects of school desegre-
gation. Kevin Brown focuses on the fear of interracial sexual relations 
that lay at the heart of the justification for segregation, especially in 
educational institutions.116 He notes that the Supreme Court first endor-
sed school desegregation in Brown v. Board of Education,117 promoted 
school desegregation in a series of subsequent rulings,118 then limited 
the scope of remedies in school desegregation cases,119 and finally loosen-
ed the standards for finding that previously segregated districts had 
attained unitary status.120 Professor Brown also traces the evolution of 
attitudes toward interracial sexual relationships from colonial times to 
the present and suggests not only that a connection exists between the 
effort to desegregate public education and the acceptance of such rela-
tionships, but also that the growing acceptance has persisted even as 
the courts have withdrawn their engagement with school desegregation. 
Next, Wendy Parker traces the process of school desegregation in 
Alabama through a careful examination of Lee v. Macon County Board 
 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J3T1MHjFBwI [https://perma.cc/ 
55PN-A2UZ].  
114. See, e.g., David J. Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King, 
Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (1986); 
David J. Garrow, Protest at Selma: Martin Luther King, Jr., and 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (1978); see also Jo Ann Gibson 
Robinson, The Montgomery Bus Boycott and the Women Who 
Started It (David J. Garrow ed., 1987). 
115. David Garrow, In Honor of Fred Gray: Making Civil Rights Law, 67 Case 
W. Res. L. Rev. 1045 (2017). 
116. Kevin Brown, The Enduring Integration School Desegregation Helped to 
Produce, 67 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1055 (2017). 
117. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
118. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); 
Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1969). 
119. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
120. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 
U.S. 237 (1991).  
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of Education,121 the long-running litigation in which Fred Gray has 
played such a prominent role.122 Professor Parker documents the pro-
gress in desegregation throughout the state but also analyzes the persis-
tence of racial inequality and disparity in Alabama schools, concluding 
with a thoughtful meditation about the uses and limitations of litigation 
as a means of effecting social reform. 
Natasha Strassfeld builds on Professor Parker’s concern about con-
tinuing racial disparities by examining the persistent disproportion in 
the placement of African American students in special education even 
after schools nominally have been desegregated.123 This phenomenon, 
like tracking and ability grouping, can promote segregation within 
schools and reinforce racial isolation in communities and the nation as 
a whole. She also analyzes efforts to combat significantly dispropor-
tionate placement of students of color in special education classes as 
well as administrative efforts to address the practice. 
Two other articles focus on race and health care, building on the 
lessons of the Tuskegee syphilis scandal. Jonathan Kahn addresses the 
intersection of race and patent law.124 Specifically, he focuses on the 
growing trend of granting regulatory approval of and patent protection 
for drugs that are promoted for use in patients of a particular race. 
Professor Kahn strongly criticizes this development and raises both 
normative and scientific objections to incorporating race as an explicit 
aspect of the medical system. 
Then Ruqaiijah Yearby builds directly on the lessons of the Tus-
kegee syphilis study by examining the extent to which economically 
disadvantaged minority children are exploited in medical research stu-
dies and the relationship between this exploitation and their access to 
health care more generally.125 Specifically, she advocates a reformulation 
of the bioethical principle of justice to include a requirement that re-
searchers provide a benefit to the population from which the research 
subjects are drawn. 
The final portion of the symposium addresses more general issues. 
Leonard Rubinowitz uses the concept of courage as a lens for under-
standing the work of Fred Gray and other civil rights lawyers who put 
 
121. See supra notes 88–90 and accompanying text. 
122. Wendy Parker, Why Alabama School Desegregation Succeeded (and Failed), 
67 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1091 (2017). 
123. Natasha M. Strassfeld, The Future of IDEA: Monitoring Disproportionate 
Representation of Minority Students in Special Education and Intentional 
Discrimination Claims, 67 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1121 (2017). 
124. Jonathan Kahn, Revisiting Racial Patents in an Era of Precision Medicine, 
67 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1153 (2017). 
125. Ruqaiijah Yearby, Exploitation in Medical Research: Forty Years After the 
Tuskegee Syphilis Study, 67 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1171 (2017). 
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their safety and sometimes even their lives at risk in their work.126 In 
addition to Mr. Gray, Professor Rubinowitz discusses Arthur Shores, 
the dean of black Alabama lawyers; Clifford Durr, a white Alabamian; 
Robert Carter, the general counsel of the NAACP; and Constance 
Baker Motley, associate counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense and Edu-
cational Fund. Courage for these purposes involves both professional 
and physical aspects, and Professor Rubinowitz explores all aspects of 
this subject in relation to these five different but significant lawyers. 
My concluding article seeks to pick up on many of the themes add-
ressed by the other authors and also to relate Fred Gray’s remarkable 
career to broader debates about the utility of law as a vehicle for social 
reform.127 Mr. Gray’s work demonstrates that the role of a truly superior 
lawyer defies easy categorization. No doubt, he is an excellent litigator, 
but he also understands that winning a lawsuit is only the first step in 
a complex process and that the law is a means to an end for clients and 
others. 
This was an extraordinary symposium. Like any extraordinary pro-
gram, many persons made it possible. Deans Jessica Berg and Michael 
Scharf of the Case Western Reserve University School of Law enthusias-
tically supported this project from the instant that they heard about it. 
Their support went well beyond financial; they also made sure that 
everything went smoothly at every step of the process. 
Thanks also to the Case Western Reserve Law Review for sponsor-
ing the symposium and publishing these articles. Executive Symposium 
Editor Chad Aronson, Editor-in-Chief Sean Sweeney, and all of the 
other members of the Law Review have performed well beyond the call 
of duty. 
Behind the scenes, Nancy Pratt and her staff made sure that the 
symposium appeared to be perfectly choreographed, even when they 
had to bail us out when we overlooked details that could have derailed 
the whole program. 
Finally, Fred Gray graced us with his presence and his illuminating 
comments throughout the program and provided the reason for the 
symposium. Thank you, Fred, for everything. 
 
126. Leonard S. Rubinowitz, The Courage of Civil Rights Lawyers: Fred Gray 
and His Colleagues, 67 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1227 (2017). 
127. Jonathan L. Entin, Fred Gray and the Role of Civil Rights Lawyers, 67 Case 
W. Res. L. Rev. 1277 (2017). 
